



2013 Columbia Law School Charities Regulation and Oversight Project 
Policy Conference on  
"The Future of State Charities Regulation" 
 
Challenges and Interests of the States in Social Mission / Hybrid Organization 
 
 







Many of today’s entrepreneurs want to commit themselves and their enterprises to 
something different than a simple bottom line of maximizing value for owners.  Instead, they 
devote their endeavors to more complex missions of pursuing social good while also generating 
profits.  This impulse goes by many names and encompasses entities with varying product lines, 
business plans, techniques and metrics.  For simplicity, this essay will refer to companies 
pursuing such dual missions as social enterprises.  Social enterprises and their founders can 
make big claims.  Some argue their businesses will be more sustainable than traditional for-
profits because they consider not only profits, but people, and planet.
2
  Others suggest the 





A mounting number of state legislatures appear convinced by these arguments.  Since 
2008, lawmakers across the country have enacted legislation enabling new and specialized 
forms of organization intended specifically to house social enterprises.  The forms include “low-
profit limited liability companies,” “benefit corporations,” “flexible purpose corporations,” or 
“social purpose corporations,” thus far, and others may be in the works.  Although these 
organizational forms are still nascent, academics have begun to explore the unique challenges 
they pose for their fiduciaries, investors, and other constituencies.
4
  One major problem this 
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2
  See J. Gregory Dees & Beth Battle Anderson, For-Profit Social Ventures, in SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1, 5–6 
(Marilyn L. Kourilsky & William B. Walstad eds., 2003). 
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 See, e.g., Why B Corps Matter, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/why-b-corps-matter 
(“Government and the nonprofit sector are necessary but insufficient to address society’s greatest challenges. 
Business, the most powerful man-made force on the planet, must create value for society, not just shareholders. 
Systemic challenges require systemic solutions and the B Corp movement offers a concrete, market-based and 
scalable solution.”). 
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work has identified is enforcement.  Yet, the opportunity for state attorneys general – tasked with 
enforcement  in adjacent areas on the state level –– has mostly gone unaddressed. This essay 
concentrates on these forms, and considers what role state attorneys general might play in their 
regulation. 
 
I. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ENFORCEMENT TODAY  
 
Over the last five years, over one third of the states have adopted one or more legal forms 
specifically designed to house social enterprises.
5
  These forms usually take one of three types:  
the low-profit limited liability company (L3C), the benefit corporation, or the flexible purpose 
corporation.  Legislation enabling each form grants adopters the ability to embrace twin goals of 
profits for owners and pursuit of a charitable or social mission.  Each also presents a somewhat 
different enforcement picture, though only one explicitly contemplates a role for public 
regulators generally or state attorneys general in particular.  This Part will review the basic 
structure and enforcement context of each of these three archetypal forms. 
 
A. Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies 
 
L3C legislation takes the limited liability company as its starting point, and grafts onto 
this framework just a few important alterations.  All of these changes deal with the proper 
purposes of adopting entities.  An L3C “must at all times significantly further the 
accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes” as defined by the tax code 
“and will not qualify as a low-profit limited liability company but for the relationship to the 
accomplishment of those charitable or educational purposes.”6  In addition, “[n]o significant 
purpose of the company is the production of income or the appreciation of property. [But t]he 
fact that a person produces significant income or capital appreciation is not, in the absence of 
other factors, conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the production of income or 
the appreciation of property.”7  Importantly, however, failure to satisfy these requirements results 




L3C statutes do not add any new layer of enforcement apparatus to that available in 
ordinary LLCs.  In a manager-managed L3C, managers may self-enforce or enforce against one 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 141 (2010); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on 
the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 342 (2009). 
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 E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31  § 1611(2)(c). 
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 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31  § 1611(3) (“A company that no longer satisfies the requirements of this 
section continues to exist as a limited liability company and shall promptly amend its certificate of formation sothat 
its name and purpose no longer identify it as a low-profit limited liability company, L3C or 13C.”) 
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another, by voting down proposals they believe incompatible with their required purposes or 
even through litigation.
9
  Whether manager- or member-managed, L3C members can also 
challenge the operations of their entities through their rights in governance or litigation.
10
  Of 
course, either of these internal checks is fraught.   
 
First, there is the “two masters” problem.11  L3Cs, like other social enterprises, are 
empowered to serve dual goals.  Language in the statutes can be read to suggest that the overall 
purposes of these social enterprises should prioritize their charitable and educational goals.
12
  
But, the L3C, like other specialized forms for social enterprise, is made to enable both these 
social goals and profit-making to coexist.
13
 Like the common critique of constituency statutes, 
the worry here is that serving two masters means serving none at all.
14
  This can be a problem 
both for self-enforcement by managers and for the realistic ability of investors to bring 
successful fiduciary duty claims.   
 
Second, the potentially dynamic preferences of investors undermine their ability to 
enforce.  Perhaps an L3C member will buy in with the goal of achieving both social and financial 
gains from her investment.  If, over time, however, the L3C’s managers err on the side of more 
financial gains, is it realistic to believe that most investors will sue to enforce its charitable and 
educational goals?  Why wouldn’t they simply pocket the extra financial gains, perhaps to 
reinvest them in a charity or another (somehow more trustworthy) social enterprise?
15
 L3C 
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L. REV. 273, 288 (2010); J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement, 
Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 39-40 
(2011); John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties 
and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, passim (2010).; Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual 
Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 105 (2010). 
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 See John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties 
and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 141 (2010); Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: 
Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1,27-28 (2011).  I believe the prioritization mandate of L3C statutes is less clear.  See Dana Brakman 
Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. __ (forthcoming 2013). 
13
 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 1611(1)-(2) (2011). 
14
 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations-A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
591, 599 (2011). 
15
 If an L3C has a private foundation member who invests as a program-related investment, perhaps the foundation’s 
independent fiduciary responsibilities will lead it to play this enforcement role. See Dana Brakman Reiser, 
Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 651 (2010). But, this may limit an L3C’s 
access to other capital if more traditional investors believe the private foundation’s enforcement will result in 
diminished financial return.  
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statutes generally do not empower any regulatory body to play a role in enforcement.
16
 L3Cs 
need not make any disclosures, to governmental authorities or to the public.  Nor can anyone 
outside the L3C enforce the obligations of its fiduciaries to comply with its stated purposes.
17
  
This mirrors the enforcement context for other business entities.  Yet, it stands in stark contrast 





The Illinois statue is an important outlier here.  The Illinois L3C statute specifies that 
L3Cs and their “chief operating officer[s], director[s], or manager[s]” qualify as “trustee[s]” 
under the state’s Charitable Trust Act.19  Under that Act, trustees are subject to the Attorney 
General’s registration and reporting requirements, which include opening registration and 
reporting documents to public inspection, as holders of charitable assets.
20
  The AG has broad 
investigatory, subpoena and enforcement powers over trustees, including the ability to seek 
punitive damages.
21
  Further, the Act outlines the minimal duties of trustees in such a way that 
might preclude Illinois L3C fiduciaries from pursuing any activities other than those in line with 




The statute is unclear whether the status of Illinois L3Cs and their fiduciaries as trustees 
under the Act applies to all of their roles, or only when they act as stewards of “charitable” 
assets.  Either way, the statute’s explicit invocation of a regulatory role is unique.  But, if the 
former position is taken, it would appear to undermine the ability of L3Cs to distribute profits to 
owners that is fundamental to L3Cs’ ability to house truly dual-mission social enterprises.  On 
the other hand, a more measured approach would suggest that Illinois L3Cs and their fiduciaries 
will be held to the same standards as their nonprofit corporate or charitable trust counterparts 
when they deal with the assets of the organization dedicated to their charitable and educational 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
In fairness, private foundations placing PRIs were the type of investors for which the L3C was originally 
envisioned.  But, there is nothing in the statutes that limits the use of the form to entities with private foundation 
investors and, the little empirical research on the question suggests that thus far, PRIs to L3Cs have been limited or 
non-existent. See Elizabeth Schmidt, Vermont's Social Hybrid Pioneers: Early Observations and Questions to 
Ponder, 35 VT. L. REV. 163, 178 (2010) (“Most of the respondents [in an empirical study of L3C founders] 
acknowledged that the possibility of PRI funding was either unimportant or not a major reason they chose the L3C 
business form. Several claimed they would have started their social enterprises even if the PRI possibility did not 
exist. . . . [T]he major reason the L3C came into existence – to facilitate PRI funding for social enterprises—was not 
the major reason these early adopters chose this business form.”). 
16
 See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations-A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 591, 614 (2011). 
17
 It is possible that the IRS might play a shadow enforcement role here. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended 
Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 110 (2010). 
18
 See MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 305-06 (2004). 
19
 805 ILCS 180/1-26(d). 
20
 760 ILCS 55/5, 6, 7. 
21
 760 ILCS 55/9, 10, 12, 16 
22
 760 ILCS 55/15.  Note especially subsection (a)(5), which states that trustees are subject to a duty “[t]o not make 
non-program loans, gifts, or advances to any person, except as allowed by the General Not For Profit Corporation 
Act of 1986,” which, if applied to all of the property of the L3C, would appear to preclude member distributions. 
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missions, but will not be so held when dealing with other L3C assets or decisions.  This 
approach, while initially attractive in not explicitly precluding dual mission entities from 
adopting the L3C form in Illinois, would likely create serious line-drawing problems.  
 
B. Flexible Purpose Corporations  
 
The flexible purpose corporation uses a corporate form as a frame, but again makes 
important alterations.  Founders must identify in a flexible purpose corporation’s articles one or 
more special purposes for it, which can be either purposes to which a charitable corporation 
could be dedicated or a large range of other purposes.
23
  The latter include “promoting positive 
short-term or long-term effects of, or minimizing adverse short-term or long-term effects of, the 
flexible purpose corporation's activities upon [t]he flexible purpose corporation's employees, 
suppliers, customers, and creditors, [t]he community and society, [or t]he environment”.24 The 
flexible purpose corporation and its fiduciaries are empowered to pursue both ordinary business 
purposes and the special purpose or purposes so identified.
25
  For a flexible purpose corporation 
to transform into an ordinary for-profit corporation, or indeed to make any change in the 
particular special purpose or purposes it has selected, the board must approve an amendment to 
the articles or an appropriate transaction, and the shareholders must consent by a supermajority 
shareholder vote.
26
 Additionally FPC directors are permitted, though not required, to consider the 
special purpose or purposes of their corporations in making decisions, along with shareholder 
value maximization. 
 
Flexible purpose corporation directors and shareholders are also the only ones 
empowered to enforce their special purpose commitments.  They can do so through governance, 
as in the shareholder vote discussed above, or through fiduciary litigation.  Again the two 
masters problem and potentially dynamic preferences of both directors and shareholders may 
limit the ability of these enforcement efforts to effectively police flexible purpose corporations’ 
devotion to their special purposes.
27
  No other constituencies, even those specified as the 
beneficiaries of the corporation’s special purpose or purposes, are given standing to enforce these 
purposes or the broader duties of the FPC’s leaders.28 
 
Regulators, too, are left out of the enforcement picture.  Founders of a flexible purpose 
corporation must file their initial articles of incorporation with the secretary of state.
29
  A flexible 
purpose corporation must also make public its required annual reports to shareholders, which 
will address both its financial well-being and its special purpose achievements and setbacks.
30
 
                                                          
23
 Cal. Corp. Code § 2602(b)(2)(B). 
24
 Cal. Corp. Code § 2602(b)(2)(B). 
25
 Cal. Corp. Code § 2604. 
26
 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 3002. 
27
 See Dana Brakman Reiser, The Next Big Thing: Flexible Purpose Corporations, __ AM. U. BUS. L. R. 124 
(forthcoming 2013). 
28
 Cal. Corp. Code §2900(b). 
29
 Cal. Corp. Code § 2600. 
30
 Cal. Corp. Code § 3500(a)-(b). 
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These reports might be used by savvy consumers, potential employees, or the media to 
investigate an individual FPC or differentiate among several.  These tools, however, are not filed 
with the AG or other state regulators.  While state AGs of course retain the ability to engage in 
consumer protection or anti-fraud actions they are empowered to undertake against any 
offending individual or entity, legislation envisions no special or official role for them in 
policing FPCs.   
 
C. Benefit Corporations 
 
The benefit corporation form shares much in common with the flexible purpose 
corporation; it is a corporate entity at its core and it relies heavily on investor enforcement.  
There are, however, two important differences.  First, benefit corporations introduce the concept 
of a third-party standard, by which organizations seeking benefit corporation status must be 
evaluated.  Benefit corporation legislation requires adopting entities to “have a purpose of 
creating general public benefit.”31  “General public benefit” is defined as “A material positive 
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party 
standard, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation.”32 In turn, a “third-party 
standard” is: 
A recognized standard for defining, reporting, and assessing corporate social and 
environmental performance that is: 
(1) Comprehensive because it assesses the effect of the business and its 
operations upon the interests [of employees, customers, the community, 
society and the local and global environment] 
(2) Developed by an entity that is not controlled by the benefit 
corporation. 
(3) Credible because it is developed by an entity that both: (i) has access to 
necessary expertise to assess overall corporate social and environmental 
performance; and (ii) uses a balanced multistakeholder approach 189 to 
develop the standard, including a reasonable public comment period. 
(4) Transparent because the following information is publicly available: 
(a)  About the standard: 
(i) The criteria considered when measuring the overall 
social and environmental performance of a business. 
(ii)  The relative weightings, if any, of those criteria. 
(b) About the development and revision of the standard: 
                                                          
31
 Model Legislation, http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf, §201; 
For simplicity’s sake, I reference Model Legislation developed by proponents of the benefit corporation form here, 
rather than the somewhat varying state enactments. 
32




(i) The identity of the directors, officers, material owners, 
and the governing body of the entity that developed and 
controls revisions to the standard. 
(ii) The process by which revisions to the standard and 
changes to the membership of the governing body are 
made. 
(iii) An accounting of the revenue and sources of financial 
support for the entity, with sufficient detail to disclose any 
relationships that could reasonably be considered to present 




The third-party standard provides a metric against which the benefit bona fides of a 
particular entity may be evaluated.  Importantly, though, the legislation does not require the 
third-party that creates a standard to apply this metric to aspiring benefit corporations or to 
certify their compliance.  Instead, individual benefit corporations must apply the third-party’s 
standard to themselves.  If a given benefit corporation finds itself able to make the grade, it 
qualifies for benefit corporation status.  Thus, to the extent that third-party standard setters are 
added to the benefit corporation’s enforcement picture, they play only a limited and indirect role.  
They do not serve as initial gatekeepers, and have no power to remove benefit corporation status 
or challenge the activities or fiduciaries of even those entities that opt to use the standards they 
promulgate.   
 
The second major difference between the benefit and flexible purpose corporation forms 
relates to the obligations of their fiduciaries.  Benefit corporation directors are required to take 
account of a long list of considerations when making decisions.   
 
In discharging the duties of their respective positions and in considering the best interests 
of the benefit corporation, the board of directors, committees of the board, and individual 
directors of a benefit corporation:  (1) shall consider the effects of any action or inaction 
upon: the shareholders of the benefit corporation;  
(i) the employees and work force of the benefit corporation, its 
subsidiaries, and its suppliers;  
(ii) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general 
public benefit or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit 
corporation;  
(iii) community and societal factors, including those of each 
community in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, 
its subsidiaries, or its suppliers are located; (v) the local and global 
environment;  
                                                          
33
 Model Legislation, http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf, § 102. 
Not all jurisdictions’ benefit corporation legislation incorporates all of these elements into the definition of a third-
party standard.  Many require only transparency and independence, and do not address comprehensiveness and 
credibility.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN § 13.1-782 (West 2012). 
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(iv) the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit 
corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the benefit 
corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that these 
interests may be best served by the continued independence of the 
benefit corporation; and  
(v) the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its 
general public benefit purpose and any specific public benefit 
purpose ….34 
 
This mandate contrasts with the FPC’s permissive approach, which merely allows 
directors to consider both shareholder value and the organization’s selected special purpose or 
purposes.  By imposing a mandate and providing a lengthy list of required considerations, benefit 
corporation approach draws many more and potentially conflicting interests into directors’ 
deliberations than in the FPC.  
 
This element of benefit corporation legislation also has an impact on enforcement.  
Although benefit corporations shareholders can sue to enforce directors’ obligations, including in 
a special benefit enforcement proceeding authorized by many statutes,
35
 the extensive list of 
required directorial considerations exacerbates the two masters problem already present in the 
L3C and FPC forms.  Directors have an easy response to challenges, so long as they can point to 
one of the many interests on this list that was furthered by their actions.
36
  Shareholder suits will 
thus be even more difficult to bring successfully than in traditional for-profit corporations, if a 
shareholder would even bother.  If a benefit corporation’s leadership should decide to pursue 
profit over its general public benefit, many shareholders might simply sit back and enjoy the 
greater returns, perhaps investing some portion of them in another social enterprise or a 
nonprofit.  Third-party standard-setters, beneficiaries or other interested parties cannot bolster 





II. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
 
The enforcement picture for social enterprises today is quite limited.  Without 
enforcement of their blended missions, however, it is difficult to see how these entities can 
succeed as viable constructs for housing social enterprises.  Why would investors seeking a 
combination of financial and social gains place their capital into a structure that promises to 
                                                          
34
 Model Legislation, http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf, § 
301(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
35
 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790(A) (West 2012). 
36
 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations-A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
591, 600 (2011); see also See Dana Brakman Reiser, The Next Big Thing: Flexible Purpose Corporations, 2 AM. U. 
BUS. L. R. 124 (forthcoming 2013). 
37
 Model Legislation, http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf, § 
301(d) (“A director does not have a duty to a person that is a beneficiary of the general public benefit purpose or a 
specific public benefit purpose of a benefit corporation arising from the status of the person as a beneficiary.”) 
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pursue both goals, but has few teeth to ensure it?  Why would entrepreneurs seeking to blend 
their aspirations to generate profits and social good adopt a form without safeguards to protect 
this dual vision?  Enforcement is key, and current forms’ reliance on fiduciary self-policing or 
investor-only accountability will likely be suboptimal.  This Part considers the potential for state 
attorneys general, already operating in the adjacent space of charity regulation, to add valuable 
enforcement expertise and resources. 
 
The first question, of course, is whether charity regulators should view enforcement in 
the social enterprise context as part of their mandate.  Regulating social enterprise might fit in 
with at least three goals of state attorneys general and their charity regulators:  protecting 
charitable assets, protecting consumers and investors from fraud or deception, and safeguarding 
the general public interest.
38
  If it will serve any of these relevant goals, state attorneys general 
may opt to dedicate resources to social enterprise enforcement.   
 
State attorneys general safeguard assets devoted to charity within their states through a 
combination of oversight activities including mandated disclosures, investigations, and civil suits 
challenging the actions of charities and their fiduciaries.  To the extent that assets of a social 
enterprise are dedicated to charitable purposes, at least to the extent they are irrevocably so 
dedicated, attorneys general may rightly view themselves as having a role in social enterprise 
enforcement.   
 
But will social enterprises typically hold assets dedicated to charitable purposes?  Under 
the three legal forms described here, at least as to assets perpetually dedicated to charitable 
purposes, the answer is no.  Neither L3Cs, nor FPCs, nor benefit corporations require any portion 
of their assets or revenues to be dedicated irrevocably to charitable purposes.  Even if one 
interprets the L3C as requiring prioritization of charitable purposes during the entity’s lifetime,39 
an L3C can be instantly and seamlessly converted to an ordinary for-profit LLC merely by 
changing its purposes and activities.  When such a transformation occurs, there is no 
sequestration of assets for entity’s formerly charitable purposes.  All assets are then available to 
be put to purely for-profit purposes.  Illinois’ statutory specification of L3Cs as trustees of 
charitable assets would appear to vary this typical result, both other than in this one state, it is 
difficult to see how to square the basic structure of the L3C form with perpetually charitable 
characterization of its assets.   
 
Perhaps, though, even outside Illinois, while an L3C maintains its charitable and 
educational purposes, the requirement that pursuing income or asset appreciation cannot be a 
                                                          
38
 Although state constitutional, statutory and common law provisions on the role and authority of attorneys general 
differ, authority over charitable assets and consumer protection is nearly universal.  See STATE ATTORNEYS 
GENERAL:  POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 183, 208 (1990); William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?: 
Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2442, 2448 (2006).  
Many state AGs also have clear and broad common law or parens patriae powers to protect the public interest.  See 
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra, at 27-39; Marshall, supra.  
39
 See John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties 
and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 141 (2010); Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: 
Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1,27-28 (2011). 
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substantial purpose of an L3C suggests that all or some portion of its assets are charitable and 
come within the ambit of AGs’ protective mandate.40  It is difficult to make even this limited 
argument with respect to FPCs or benefit corporations, the enabling legislation for which makes 
no suggestion that charitable purposes are required or must be pursued over other purposes or 
priorities.  An FPC may, but need not, be founded for charitable purposes; it might instead be 
founded to benefit “employees, suppliers, customers, [or] creditors,”41 purposes very unlikely to 
qualify as charitable under state law.  FPC directors are permitted to choose among the purposes 
of pursuing value for owners and the FPC’s special purpose in their decision-making, and the 
statute imposes no strict prioritization regime.  A benefit corporation must be founded to pursue 
some “general public benefit,” but likewise this benefit need not be a strictly charitable 
purpose.
42
  Further, benefit corporation statutes often explicitly eschew any required ordering of 
organizational priorities.
43
 Although social enterprises surely occupy some of the same space as 
nonprofit charities, and significant adjacent space pursuing social good, their organizational 
forms should not alone suffice to characterize their assets as charitable.
44
   
 
Protecting investors and consumers from fraudulent and deceptive practices is another 
important part of the mandate of state attorneys general, and it could also impel them to regulate 
and enforce in the social enterprise space.  Indeed, the charitable solicitation focus of many state 
attorneys’ general in regulating of charities can be seen as a marriage of AGs’ concern for 
charitable assets and donors as a unique type of consumer or investor.
45
 Social enterprises make 
claims to consumers and investors, especially about the blended character of their enterprises.  
Like in the charitable sphere, it can be difficult for consumers, investors, or anyone to determine 
whether the social goals of the enterprise are being met.  And, the inherent tension between profit 
and social goals complicates matters further.  The “good guy” claims of social enterprises 
coupled with the difficulty of assessing their claims may make social enterprises particularly 
attractive to charlatans, and particularly dangerous for well-meaning consumers and investors.  
Attorneys general seeking to protect their citizens from deceptive schemes might thus target 
social enterprises for special attention and scrutiny. 
 
AGs’ interest in promoting the public interest in their jurisdictions, however, might lead 
them to consider social enterprise enforcement for just the opposite reasons.  Like so many 
others, AGs may be intrigued by the promise of social enterprise.  The idea of harnessing the 
efficiency of business methods and the power to scale that for-profit capital enables in order to 
                                                          
40
 Other papers for this conference speak comprehensively to this question, so I address it only in brief. 
41
 Cal. Corp. Code § 2602(b)(2)(B)(i). 
42
 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-06(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012). 
43
 Model Legislation, http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf, § 
301(a)(3) (noting that directors “need not give priority to the interests of a particular person or group … over the 
interests of any other person or group unless the benefit corporation has stated in its articles of incorporation its 
intention to give [such] priority”). 
44
 The FPC statute is careful to state its terms should not “be construed as negating existing charitable trust 
principles or the Attorney General's authority to enforce any charitable trust created,”  Cal. Corp. Code § 2700, and 
an individual FPC might take actions that would deem some or all of its assets charitable ones.   
45
 See Evelyn Brody, Accountability and the Public Trust, 471,  479 in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA (Lester 
Salamon, ed. 2002).  
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create social benefits for those in need and the public at large is attractive and exciting.  But, as 
discussed above, this promise is unlikely to be realized without some enforcement mechanism to 
allow entrepreneurs and investors to ensure each other of their commitments to dual mission.  If 
AGs believe that successful social enterprise can enhance their communities and help solve 
social problems, they may devote resources to social enterprise enforcement to increase its 
chances of success.   
 
Legislatures might also draft AGs into social enterprise enforcement.  As noted earlier, 
currently only the Illinois L3C enabling statute expressly creates a role in social enterprise 
enforcement for state attorneys general. In other work, I have argued that to create a fruitful 
specialized form for social enterprise, they must be required to prioritize social good and a 
realistic and consistent enforcement structure must exist.
46
 If state legislatures take up the call to 
add or enable an enforcement architecture for social enterprise, they could decide to enlist 
attorneys general to play a role in regulation.  
 
Attorneys general certainly have skills and competencies that could be used to enforce 
the obligations of social enterprises and their leaders.  The disclosure system AGs use to regulate 
charities could be adapted to apply to social enterprises.
47
  Demanding registration and reporting 
could helpfully compel social enterprises and their leaders to reflect on their activities. Indeed, 
the FPC and benefit corporation forms already require significant annual disclosures to be made 
to their shareholders and publicly posted.
48
  Requiring this or a more structured disclosure to be 
submitted to state attorneys general might also alert regulators to sham entities and bad actors.  
 
Charity regulators also already regularly deal with enforcing fiduciary duties.  In 
particular, they have expertise dealing with the challenging question of defining care and loyalty 
(and, in some cases in some jurisdictions, obedience) in the context of entities pursuing social 
good.  Unlike in the for-profit context, where a single bottom line of profit-maximization or 
value-generation can often be used to assess performance, charities frequently pursue missions 
that are fuzzy and dynamic.  The expertise AG charity regulators have in dealing with these 
entities may help them deal with the complexity created by social enterprises’ dual and often-
conflicting purposes.  There is the possibility, of course, that AGs tasked with enforcing social 
enterprise would concentrate too much on ensuring fidelity to social mission and too little on 
ensuring their focus on profits.
49
  But, other potential enforcement resources, including investors 




                                                          
46
 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. __ (forthcoming 2013). 
47
 State AGs would not be able to accept the federal Form 990 informational tax return in lieu of specialized state 
disclosures for social enterprises, as many do for nonprofits.  As discussed infra, social enterprises are not now and 
are unlikely to be granted federal tax benefits and are and therefore not required to complete such forms. 
48
 A few statutes also require benefit corporations to file their required annual reports with a state official. See, e.g., 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §§ 15–16 (West Supp. 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(d)(1) (West Supp. 
2011); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-13 (2012) (specifically noting that the state’s involvement with entity 
filings is “ministerial”) 
49
 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. __ (forthcoming 2013). 
50
 See id. 
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Additionally, attorneys general have significant relevant expertise in their consumer 
protection bureaus.  As they might track and penalize unscrupulous auto dealers and Ponzi 
schemers, AGs steeped in consumer protection may be able to spot duplicitous marketing by 
social enterprises.  AGs’ broad investigatory and prosecutorial powers in both the consumer 
protection and charity regulation contexts could also be deployed to challenge and punish social 
enterprises that make misleading claims to consumers, solicit capital on terms unfair to investors, 
or that fail to live up to the claims they make or terms they undertake. 
 
As most Attorneys General are elected officials, they also have an important link to the 
people.  This political reality provides them with legitimacy to determine whether a jurisdiction’s 
citizenry is interested in seeding successful social enterprise.  Citizens might desire to do so in 
order to achieve the efficiency and scalability gains for social good creation addressed above.  
Alternatively, citizens might clamor for businesses to be more accountable, socially responsible, 
or sustainable, and developing a social enterprise sector might be part of answering such 
demands.  Thus far, legislatures have thus far been the political actors at the forefront of 
developing forms for social enterprise.  Just one serious social enterprise scandal might, 
however, convince an AG of the political value of enforcement in this area.  
 
The looming question here is whether AGs will be able to undertake the cost of 
enforcement in this new and uncharted area.  Unfortunately, the resource picture is bleak.  In 
these times of economic fragility, states are strapped or worse.  Even in good times, AG offices 
are perennially understaffed and under-resourced.  It has become a commonplace to remark on 
the staggeringly low funding and personnel levels of AG charity regulators in particular.
51
  
Without an external injection of funding or a damaging public scandal, it is difficult to see how 
AGs could add a serious level of social enterprise enforcement to their overcrowded agendas.  
Despite their fit for the job, there is simply little state attorneys general can be expected to add.  
 
Furthermore, unlike in the charity context, federal tax authorities cannot be counted upon 
to complement or backstop state enforcement efforts.  As yet, none of the specialized forms for 
social enterprise developed in the states qualify for any federal tax benefits.  They are not tax-
exempt, nor do they offer contributors tax-deductibility, and these tax benefits are not on the 
horizon.  Congress certainly will not extend charitable tax-exemption and deductible 
contributions to social enterprises based simply on an entity’s adoption of L3C, FPC, or benefit 
corporation forms, given their complete lack of a reliable enforcement apparatus.  In the era of 
fiscal cliffs, debt-ceiling negotiations, and rising tax burdens, Congress or the Department of 
Treasury are also highly unlikely to adopt significant specialized tax benefits for social 





Unfortunately, invoking the regulatory authority of state attorneys general is no panacea 
for the weaknesses of social enterprise enforcement.  While simply forming as a social enterprise 
should not subject an entity to the attorney general’s jurisdiction over charitable assets, social 
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 See Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Duties of Nonprofit Corporate Directors-Emphasizing Oversight 
Responsibilities, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1845, 1879 n. 163 (2012) (cataloguing scholarship on the topic). 
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enterprise enforcement could fit within various parts of AGs’ mandates.  Attorneys general 
certainly have authority to enforce against consumer or other fraud or deception by social 
enterprises.  They could also engage in enforcement to help make social enterprise more 
effective, either as part of pursuing the public interest of their jurisdictions and their citizens or in 
response to legislation imposing a regulatory role upon them.  AGs’ experience and skills would 
translate well to crafting a disclosure system for social enterprises, monitoring and enforcing the 
obligations of their fiduciaries, and detecting, investigating, and prosecuting bad actors.  
Moreover, their positions as elected representatives will help them determine the level of such 
enforcement the public desires. 
 
To do any of this, though, will require resources.  Current resources for AG enforcement 
are low and subject to pressure to cut costs, not increase them.  Charities bureaus, in particular, 
are always strapped for funds and personnel.  The federal government is unlikely to play a role, 
and there is little likelihood of significant resource increases from states in the near future.  Thus, 
despite their propriety and capacity for the job, attorneys general will not make up for the 
deficiencies in enforcement in L3Cs, FPCs and benefit corporations.   
 
Those who want social enterprise to succeed, and who realize that enforcement is pivotal, 
should look elsewhere.
52
  In my view, if states want to create forms of organization to entice and 
enable social enterprise, legislatures must begin by setting a clear prioritization of social good 
within the specialized entities they enable.
53
  Such prioritization would ameliorate, though not 
completely solve, the multiple masters problems inherent in social enterprises.  Further, it would 
be a first step at enabling enforcement by investors, and self-regulation by social enterprises, 
third parties or both.
54
  Even if no new resources become available for AG enforcement, as 
seems likely, their existing consumer protection and in certain cases charitable asset and general 
public interest protection goals will lead them to act as backstop.  Although admittedly on a 
smaller scale, this combination of enforcement resources might not be so different from what we 
see in the charity context.  
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